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Chapter  8
Function over Form:
A Behavioral Approach to Implicit Attitudes
ABSTRACT
Research surrounding the construct of “implicit attitudes” and the various methodologies for measuring 
that construct is currently founded on the social cognitive paradigm. However, no robust and agreed 
upon theoretical framework has emerged from this paradigm, despite the widespread adoption of im-
plicit testing methodologies and their associated theoretical assumptions. The current chapter outlines 
a functional approach to implicit testing, describing research stemming from Relational Frame Theory 
that was developed in parallel with the emergence of the IAT, and arguing for the benefits of connect-
ing these two strands of research to improve the understanding of attitude behaviors and create better 
understood implicit testing methodologies. The chapter concludes with descriptions of two examples of 
such methodologies: the IRAP and the FAST.
INTRODUCTION
Form: The Implicit Attitude Construct
The central pillar of the cognitive paradigm is the 
position that mental representations mediate how 
information is perceived, processed, analyzed, 
stored in the brain, and that these representations 
precede behavior in the chain of cause and effect. 
These mental representations are conceptualized 
in terms of hypothetical constructs infered from 
observable behavior, which are in turn thought 
to explain that behavior. In the field of Social 
Psychology, there is no more ubiquitous construct 
than the Attitude.
Despite its central place in explaining human 
social behavior (Allport, 1935), there is no uni-
versally agreed upon definition of what precisely 
Anthony G. O’Reilly
National University of Ireland – Maynooth, Ireland
Bryan Roche
National University of Ireland – Maynooth, Ireland
Aoife Cartwright
National University of Ireland – Maynooth, Ireland
DOI: 10.4018/978-1-4666-6599-6.ch008
163
Function over Form
 
is represented by an attitude. There is, however, 
broad agreement on the general form of the attitude 
construct. An attitude is usually defined as being 
a combination of cognitive (i.e. propositional) and 
affective evaluations of an object with a variable 
strength (Olson & Kendrick, 2008). An attitude 
is thought to be stored in the mind as a set of as-
sociations between the attitude object and these 
evaluations, with attitude strength being a function 
of the relative accessibility of these associations. 
When activated, attitudes predispose the person 
towards a favorable or unfavorable behavioral 
response towards the attitude object (see Olson 
& Zanna, 1993, for a review). Attitudes can be 
formed in relation to any given object including 
other individuals (e.g., McConnell, Rydell, Strain, 
& Mackie, 2008), social groups (e.g., Dovidio, 
Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002), or even abstract 
concepts (e.g., nationality; Devos & Banaji, 
2005). Stereotypes, prejudice, self-esteem, general 
positive or negative evaluations and biases all fall 
under the umbrella of “attitude”. As such, attitude 
research has historically been a key topic in social 
cognitive research, and it is likely to continue to 
be so for many years to come. However, attitude 
research underwent a minor revolution in the last 
years of the 20th century, with the introduction of 
the concept of implicit attitudes.
Greenwald and Banajii’s 1995 paper simul-
taneously introduced the concept of implicit 
attitudes and a methodology designed to detect 
this new hypothetical construct – The Implicit 
Association Test (IAT). Drawing upon research 
in implicit memory, the authors described how 
past experience can influence present attitudes 
and the responses mediated by those attitudes 
without conscious awareness. Central to the new 
concept was the suggestion that some experiences 
lead to the formation of evaluative associations 
(i.e., attitudes) that were not readily accessible by 
introspection and whose influence on behavior is 
outwith the control of the subject. The implicit 
attitude construct was said to explain why self-
reported attitudes were not reliable predictors 
of behavior. More specifically, the behavior was 
considered to be mediated by implicit attitudes, 
which in turn can be defined as “the introspec-
tively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) 
trace of past experience that mediates [favorable 
or unfavorable feeling, thought or action towards 
social objects]” (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995, p.8).
The seminal IAT experiment used a “known 
groups” paradigm, presenting participants with 
flower names (e.g. Tulip), “insect” names (e.g. 
Spider), pleasant words (e.g. Love) and unpleas-
ant words (e.g. Ugly) and required participants 
to categorize them by means of a key press. 
(Greenwald, McGhee & Schwartz, 1998). In the 
first (consistent) condition, the same response 
key was assigned to both “flower” and “pleasant” 
words, while the other response key was assigned 
to “insect” and “unpleasant” words. In the second 
(inconsistent) condition, one response key was 
assigned to “unpleasant” words and “flower” 
words, and the other to “pleasant” and “insect” 
words. The researchers found (as expected) that 
reaction times were shorter in the consistent con-
dition than in the inconsistent condition. In line 
with the pre-experimental assumptions outlined 
above, Greenwald and colleagues stated that the 
IAT effect (i.e., the difference in response times 
between the two conditions) was indicative of 
the existence of an implicit attitude construct in 
which flowers were associated with positive evalu-
ations and insects with negative associations. The 
magnitude of the difference between the normed 
reaction times in each condition is taken to be an 
indicator of the associative strength between the 
category of interest and a positive/negative at-
tribute (e.g., Hoffman, Gawronski, Geschwnder, 
Le, & Schmidt, 2005). The implicit associations 
so measured by the IAT are assumed to be rela-
tively stable, trait-like cognitive associations that 
are existent objects in the individual (Nosek & 
Hanson, 2008).
Despite the widespread adoption of the IAT 
methodology and the tacit acceptance of its theo-
retical assumptions, Greenwald and his colleague 
164
Function over Form
 
are “theory uncommitted” (Greenwalk, Nosek, 
Banaji & Klauer, 2005) with regard to the pre-
cise structure of the mental associations the IAT 
purports to measure, and with regard to precisely 
what mental construct causes the IAT effect. The 
main empircal evidence for Greenwald’s account 
of implicit attitudes (which informed the creation 
of the IAT) comes from the IAT effect itself, which 
it turn relies on the associative assumption within 
the implicit cognition theory in order to explain the 
effect. This position represents a form of circular 
reasoning, rendering the IAT and implicit social 
cognition research more generally lacking in a 
unaminously agreed-upon testable model than 
can explain the IAT effect (Fiedler, Messner, & 
Blumke, 2006; Gavin, Roche & Ruiz, 2008; Roche, 
O’Reilly, Gavin, Ruiz, & Aranciba, 2012). There 
is widespread concern in the social cognitive field 
(e.g., Blanton & Jaccard 2006; De Houwer, 2009; 
Fazio & Olson, 2003; Gawronsk, Lebel, Peters & 
Banse, 2009; Hughes et al, 2011; Rothermund & 
Wentura, 2004) regarding the “deplorable discon-
nect between basic research on the mechanisms 
underlying implicit measures and the somewhat 
wider reception of research using these methods” 
(Gawronski, Lebel & Peters, 2007).
It is precisely that “deplorable disconnect” that 
this chapter aims to address. Using behavioral 
manifestations such as response latencies of as-
sumed cognitive structures, such as unconscious 
bias, to infer the existence of those very constructs 
is the source of much of the conceptual ambuguity 
and disagreement surrounding the theory underly-
ing implicit attitude research (De Houwer, 2011). 
When the sources of an effect are hypothethical and 
conceptual controlling the outcomes of tests for 
those processes becomes a haphazard endeavour, 
in which changes in experimental methodology 
are dictated by a disputed or ambiguous point of 
theory. Functionally oriented approaches to the 
analysis of behavior aim their scrutiny directly 
at the underlying mechanisms of behavior. A 
behavior-analytic account of implicit attitudes 
and implicit testing methodologies can explain 
from the bottom up, in well defined technical 
terms, each and every apsect of an implicit test 
performance, as well as identifying the sources 
of historical and environmental control over test 
outcomes. This approach yields a far less specula-
tive account of the processes involved, which in 
turn leads to more robust theory.
Jan DeHouwer (2011) has outlined the benefits 
of integrating functionally oriented research into 
the cognitive paradigm, leading to what he calls 
a functional-cognitive framework. DeHouwer 
argued that the functional approach is useful to 
the social cognitivist in that it provides useful and 
actionable information about the environmental 
causes of behavior and the environmental variables 
that can be experimentally manipulated to produce 
or alter a behavioral effect (such as the IAT ef-
fect) without requiring any reference to mental 
constructs as causal events. This information 
allows the cognitively oriented psychologist to 
make more informed inferences about the mental 
constructs assumed to mediate such behavioral 
effects by eliminating a priori assumptions about 
the processes underpinning those constructs and 
by providing clear information about the input to 
those mental processes. The functional approach 
informs the cognitive approach as to the facts (be-
haviors) that need to be accounted for with mental 
explanations, without reference to those mental 
explanations themselves. This is a pragmatic ap-
proach which puts aside the philosophical differ-
ences regarding the ontological status of mental 
representations in favor of developing a research 
program with strong theoretical underpinnings 
on the process level, leaving the debate regarding 
the neccesity of mental representations as causal 
objects to a future in which the body of evidence 
is more complete.
Function: The Stimulus Equivalence/
Relational Frame Theory Account
As it happens, there is already a wealth of function-
ally-oriented behavior-analytic work examining 
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the same phenomena that inspired the Implicit 
Social Cognition revolution and the development 
of the IAT. This work has been proceeding in 
parrallel with the development of the the IAT, 
with the two threads only rarely making contact. 
The following section will detail the history of 
the behavior-analytic research that informs this 
functional account of implicit attitudes, before 
bringing the threads together by offering a func-
tional account of the Implicit Association Test 
and of Implicit Attitudes.
Relational Frame Theory (RFT: Hayes, 
Barnes-Holmes & Roche, 2001) emerged from 
the behavior-analytic literature around the same 
time that Implicit Social Cognition research began 
to take off in the social-cognitive mainstream, 
and while the methodologies and theoretical/
philosophical underpinnings of the work are quite 
different, there are many interesting parallels in the 
subject matter of both fields. As RFT will likely be 
unfamiliar to many readers, the authors will now 
describe its basic premises and development with 
regard to implicit attitude phenomena in detail.
The RFT approach is a modern behavioral ac-
count of human language and cognition that has 
proved able to tackle questions long thought to 
be out of reach of the behavior-analytic approach. 
RFT has made a multitude of advances in the 
behavioral understanding of such areas of cogni-
tion as analogical reasoning (Carpenter, Smeets & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2003; Stewart & Barnes-Holmes 
2004; Stewart, Barnes-Holmes & Weil, 2009), 
assessment and training of intellectual skills 
(e.g., Cassidy, Roche & Hayes, 2011; O’Toole & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2009), in applied developmental 
and clinical arenas (McHugh, Barnes-Holmes & 
Barnes-Holmes, 2004; Rehfeldt, Dillen, Ziomek & 
Kowalchuck, 2007; Villatte, Monestes, McHugh, 
Freixa i Baque & Loas, 2010a, 2010b; Weil, Hayes 
& Capurro, 2011) and generative verbal behavior 
in developmentally delayed children (e.g., Heagle 
& Rehfeldt, 2006; Moran, Stewart, McElwee & 
Ming, 2010; Murphy & Barnes-Holmes 2009). In 
addition to its success in these areas, the authors 
believe that RFT can be a powerful explanatory 
tool for researchers interested in implicit attitudes.
Relational Frame Theory offers the attitude re-
searcher an account of language and cognition that 
is founded upon a single core process – relational 
framing. This process is precisely articulated in a 
bottom up account that specifies the interactions 
necessary between organism and environment (see 
below) for this behavioral process to emerge. The 
bottom-up, functional-analytic approach taken by 
RFT builds incrementally from elementary core 
processes, but retains the explanatory power nec-
essary to tackle more complex forms of behavior 
with the same precise terminology. The relational 
framing account of language has the potential to 
shed light on the fundamental processes which 
underlie attitude constructs, allowing for a more 
nuanced theoretical account of their formation 
and change, and to guide research into method-
ologies which might more accurately and reliably 
measure attitudes.
Much of the research that underpins current 
thinking on relational framing has grown from the 
discovery of the phenomenon of stimulus equiva-
lence over forty years ago. The way in which this 
simple phenomenon was studied and built upon 
exemplifies the functional approach.
Murray Sidman’s (1971) investigations into 
this phenomenon began while conducting research 
into the behavior of participants who experienced 
difficulty reading, writing, and speaking. He used 
a Matching-to-Sample (MTS) procedure, a con-
ditional discrimination procedure in which two 
stimuli (let’s call them B1 and B2) are presented 
as response options to be discriminated between 
and the correct response is determined by the 
presence of the conditional stimulus (let’s call it 
A1). In effect, an “if-then” relation is established 
for the child, such as “If A1 is present, select B1 
rather than B2”. Or, “If A2 is present, select B2, 
rather than B1”. In Sidman’s study each trial 
involved the presentation of a sample stimulus, 
either a picture of the object to be named (e.g., 
a picture of a cat), a word (e.g., “cat”), or an 
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auditory stimulus (e.g., the word “cat” spoken 
aloud to the participant). In matching tests, the 
participants were required to choose the correct 
comparison stimulus (a picture or a word) from 
an array of eight choices (pictures or words). In 
oral naming tests, the participant was required to 
name the sample stimulus aloud.
Using the matching to sample procedure, the 
researchers taught the first participant to match 
the spoken word samples to the correct written 
word. Without any further direct training, the par-
ticipant was then able to match written words to 
pictures (and vice versa) and to name the written 
words. This emergent behavior caused significant 
excitement for Sidman and his collaborators (Sid-
man, 1982).
The vital finding was that teaching two sets of 
conditional discriminations caused novel behav-
iors to emerge without direct training. This early 
glimpse of the phenomenon caused Sidman to 
focus his research on defining stimulus equiva-
lence and establishing the necessary and sufficient 
historical and current conditions required to pro-
duce and test it in the laboratory.
Stimulus equivalence was defined procedurally 
(Sidman, 1982) as responding that displays the 
properties of reflexivity, transitivity, and sym-
metry. When a verbally able human participant is 
trained in (at least) two conditional discriminations 
(e.g., given A1 pick B1 and not B2, given A2 pick 
B2 and not B1, given B1 pick C1 and not C2, and 
given B2 pick C2 and not C1) the participant will 
behave in ways that have not been reinforced by 
the experimenter. Specifically, when a participant 
is presented with A1, she will pick A1, match-
ing each stimulus with itself (reflexivity). When 
presented with B1, she will pick A1, reversing the 
direction of the trained relation (symmetry). When 
presented with C1, she will select A1, deriving 
the untrained identity relation between the stimuli 
that were never paired (transitivity).
The generativity and stimulus substitutability 
characteristics of Stimulus Equivalence suggested 
a strong link between stimulus equivalence and 
language. With the emergence of this new phe-
nomenon, behavior analysts began developing a 
new model of verbal behavior involving derived 
or emergent stimulus relations (For a full review 
of the evidence linking the stimulus equivalence 
phenomenon to language the reader is referred 
to Dymond and Roche, 2013). Expanding their 
explanation beyond simple stimulus equivalence 
into more varied forms of stimulus relations, 
behavior analysts developed Relational Frame 
Theory, which in turn informs the functional 
account of implicit testing and implicit attitudes 
described later in this chapter.
The Relational Frame Theory account of lan-
guage and cognition draws upon and elaborates 
the stimulus equivalence phenomenon. As well as 
being able to discriminate (i.e., detect and respond 
to) specific stimuli, organisms are also capable 
of responding to relations between stimuli such 
as similarity, difference, distance, greater than, 
and so on. These forms of responding are known 
collectively as relational responding or relational 
framing. Nonverbal organisms are capable of 
learning to respond to such formal relations as 
size and distance, via traditional learning pro-
cesses such as operant conditioning (see Reese, 
1968). Verbal organisms, however, display the 
unique ability to respond to arbitrary stimulus 
relations such as oppositeness, value and time, 
that are not tied to the formal properties of the 
stimuli involved (e.g., a small coin can be worth 
more than a large coin). This form of responding 
is called arbitrarily applied relational responding 
(AARR; Hayes et al., 2001).
As seen in stimulus equivalence, verbal organ-
isms can derive equivalences between stimuli that 
have never been explicitly matched. The different 
forms of relational responding (difference, op-
position, greater than, less than, etc) can also be 
derived without explicit training (e.g., Dymond 
& Barnes, 1995; Lipkens, Hayes, & Hayes, 1993; 
Roche & Barnes, 1996). This leads us to derived 
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relational responding (DRR), perhaps the core 
behavior underpinning language and cognition. 
The following paragraphs describe the specific 
properties of DRR.
Mutual entailment means that if A is related 
to B, then B is related to A in a complimentary 
fashion. For example, if A is opposite to B, then B 
is opposite to A. If A is more than B, then B is less 
than A. Combinatorial entailment occurs when 
three or more stimuli are related. If A is opposite 
to B, and B is opposite to C, then the relation that 
is derived between A and C is one of equivalence, 
because both are opposite to B. Combinatorial 
entailment refers to the reciprocal relationships 
that exist between two stimuli as mediated by 
other intermediary stimuli (Blackledge, 2003).
The RFT account of attitudes begins to come 
into focus with the introduction of one final feature 
-Transformation of function. Expressed simply, 
transformation of function refers to the well docu-
mented fact that when two stimuli are related, the 
psychological functions of each stimulus changes 
the functions of the other, according to how the 
stimuli are related (see Dymond & Rehfeldt, 2000, 
for a review). For instance, if an individual shows a 
preference for a particular soft-drink labelled using 
a specific term, and that term in turn participates 
in a derived (i.e., untrained) relation with other 
sitmuli, a similar preference will also be shown 
for novel drinks labelled using those other sti-
mili (Barnes-Holmes, Keane, Barnes-Holmes & 
Smeets, 2000; Smeets & Barnes-Holmes, 2003). 
In effect, the psychological response functions 
established for the original label by virtue of its 
being directly related to a preferred drink (i.e., sali-
vation, appetitive thoughts, increased behavioral 
probability of drinking the liquid) transform the 
response functions of all indirectly related stimuli 
(e.g., other related labels and drinks).
A critical feature of the RFT approach to lan-
guage is that the derivation of stimulus relations 
and the transformation of stimulus functions is 
entirely controlled by historical events and is 
predictable where control over trained stimulus 
relations is possible. Specifically, AARR emerges 
from the process of operant conditioning involved 
in such tasks as simply learning to name objects. 
For example, a child is trained to name an object 
out loud when presented with the object, and to 
orient towards the object when the object’s name 
is spoken. After a number of object-name and 
name-object relations are trained, the generalized 
operant response class of “naming” is established 
in the presence of appropriate contextual cues such 
as the word “is”, as employed in the utterances 
“This is your shoe” or “What is that?” The history 
of responding establishes the specific contextual 
cues for “naming”, a form of relational responding 
(equivalence). Likewise, other forms of relational 
responding, both basic and derived, are established 
through multiple exemplar training under the 
control of environmental cues (usually words). 
In effect, no further process at the psychological 
level needs to be appealed to in order to understand 
how humans come to derive relations.
The ability of an individual to derive stimulus 
relations and transform stimulus functions accord-
ingly need not be explained by such phenomena 
as “propositions” or insight”. Rather, the process 
of arbitrarily applicable relational responding 
explains those phenomena. This is a radical de-
parture in conceptual terms from the mainstream 
view that behavior is ultimately controlled from 
the inside out. However, this perspective brings 
with it a remarkable and parsimonious explanatory 
power that requires no mental representational 
constructs or the attendant obligation to study these 
rather than the original behavioral phenomenon 
of interest. Researchers can focus on researching 
the specific histories that lead to the emergence of 
the verbal behaviors associated with the attitude 
construct. The following section details the RFT 
model of attitudes, and the methodologies that 
emerged from that model parallel to the IAT and 
other social-cognitive implicit tests.
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Measuring Attitudes as 
Histories of Verbal Behavior
The phenomena of transfer of function and re-
lational responding combine to inform the RFT 
model of attitudes. From the behavior-analytic 
perspective, an attitude may now be conceived of 
as a history of derived and explicitly reinforced 
stimulus relations according to which the functions 
of events are transformed (e.g., Grey & Barnes, 
1996). As such, an attitude can be thought of as a 
verbal event (or series thereof) which emerges from 
our interactions with others and with our environ-
ment across our personal learning history. Thus, 
an attitude is established and maintained through 
a history of both explicitly reinforced relations 
and untrained derived relations between verbal 
stimuli. The remote social contingencies which 
support these networks of relational responses 
can be represented by the verbal practices of the 
wider community (i.e., the culture with which 
the participant interacts). For instance, rules, 
norms, mores, and taboos all constitute forms of 
verbal contingency that specify relations between 
stimuli (e.g., “sex” and “dirty”) in often complex 
and subtle (i.e., indirect) ways. A participant’s 
past participation in a verbal environment (i.e., a 
culture) provides many hundreds of training ex-
emplars that establish complex derived relational 
networks through which functions of stimuli may 
be transformed, and this can explain the emer-
gence of apparently untrained or indirectly trained 
responses and attitudes. This occurs because of 
the way in which the various terms were framed 
relationally in language, whether explicitly, or in 
turn by further derived relations (e.g., innuendo, 
jokes; see Roche, Barnes-Holmes & Barnes-
Holmes, 2002).
In an early example of a behavior-analytic 
study of attitudes, Kohlenberg, Hayes, and Hayes 
(1991) investigated a model of social stereotyping 
based on verbal control over equivalence classes. 
They suggested, for example, that in the sentence 
“the woman complained and complained”, the 
word “woman” may serve as a contextual cue 
for relating the word “complain” to the words 
“nag” or “bitch”. In a structurally similar sen-
tence “the man complained and complained”, 
the word “man” serves as a contextual cue which 
occasions relating “complain” with “assertive” 
or “forceful”. In Experiment 1 of their study, 
participants were exposed to training to form six 
four-member equivalence classes using nonsense 
syllables as stimuli. The members of each class 
were contingent on a contextual cue – either a 
male or female name. That is, when a male name 
was present, responding to A1-B1-C1 and D1 as 
equivalent was reinforced, and when a female 
name was on screen, responding to A1-B1-C3 
and D3 was reinforced. The experimenters then 
tested for derived equivalence relations using novel 
male and female names as contextual cues. Par-
ticipants related the novel male and female names 
according to the trained derived relations despite 
having no experimental history of responding 
to those names. In effect this demonstrated that 
control over the trained equivalence classes had 
generalized through classes of by pre-existing 
contextual cues (i.e., gender classifications). The 
researchers had in effect demonstrated a means 
by which socially established classes based on 
gender could be assessed subtly and indirectly 
without engendering social desirability.
Experiment 2 brought the process under further 
control by generating pre-experimental equiva-
lence classes of nonsense syllables, which were 
then used as the contextual cues in place of male 
and female names. Thus, the researchers modeled 
the process shown in experiment 1 with entirely 
laboratory-controlled histories (whereas Male 
and Female names would have had extensive pre-
experimental histories which the experimenters 
could not know the details of). These experiments 
showed that contextual control could transfer 
without direct training from one stimulus to other 
stimuli with which it shares equivalence class 
membership. This process can be studied in a 
highly controlled manner, thus shedding light on 
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the types of histories which could produce social 
stereotyping behavior without any need for an 
appeal to an explanatory mental construct.
In another early study, Grey and Barnes 
(1996) suggested that a negative attitude towards 
normal heterosexual interactions can be seen as 
responding in accordance with an equivalence 
relation between normal opposite-sex adults 
and descriptive terms such as ‘disgusting’. Their 
empirical study demonstrated a transformation 
of a trained attitudinal or evaluative response 
from one member of an equivalence class to the 
other members of the equivalence class. These 
researchers provided participants with the neces-
sary conditional discrimination training to form 
the following three derived equivalence relations; 
A1-B1-C1, A2-B2-C2, and A3-B3-C3, using non-
sense syllables as stimuli. Participants then viewed 
the video contents of VHS videocassettes that 
were clearly labeled with the A1 and A2 stimuli. 
One of the cassettes contained sexual/romantic 
scenes, while the other contained religiously 
themed scenes. Subsequently, participants were 
asked to categorize four novel videocassettes, each 
labeled as B1, C1, B2 or C2. They were given no 
information about these cassettes, but they catego-
rized them according to the derived equivalence 
classes. That is, participants classified the B1 and 
C1 cassettes in the same way as the A1 cassette, 
and the B2 and C2 cassette in the same way as 
the A2 cassette. In effect, the study demonstrated 
the sexual and religious evaluative functions of 
the A-labeled cassettes and the derived relations 
in which the A stimuli participated, transformed 
the functions of the C-labeled cassettes, such that 
these were responded to as sexual or religious as 
appropriate. This study demonstrated a process 
by which evaluative responses (i.e. attitudes) can 
be indirectly trained and measured.
Dixon, Dymond, Rehfeldt, Roche, & Zlomke 
(2003) applied the transfer-of-function model to 
the understanding of attitude changes to Muslim 
men in the aftermath of the September 11th ter-
rorist attacks in the USA. They suggested that 
on hearing of the terrorist (A) attack a white 
American male may instantly experience feelings 
of rage (B). The media may claim that Terrorists 
(A) are responsible for these acts, and pictures 
of these Terrorists may be shown on the televi-
sion (C). In effect, an A-B and A-C relation has 
been established by direct media reports, but a 
derived relations account explains how images of 
the terrorists themselves may now come to elicit 
feelings of hate or rage. This occurs by virtue of 
a transfer of response function across the stimuli 
in the newly created relation (i.e., B to C). As 
the most salient features of the terrorists are their 
race, religion, and country of origin these feelings 
of hate and rage towards the terrorists begin to 
transfer to other persons sharing the same skin 
colour, religion, and country of origin because 
of a formal similarity between them and the ter-
rorists (i.e., simple stimulus generalization). That 
is, innocent Muslims of a Middle Eastern descent 
are now responded to as equivalent to the A, B 
and C stimuli and the feelings of hate and rage 
felt by the hypothetical American may now have 
transferred beyond the terrorists themselves to all 
middle Eastern people. This process was modeled 
in the laboratory by Dixon et al. (2003).
The above studies showed the potential of an 
RFT paradigm to detail the processes involved 
in the establishment of behaviors that we might 
refer to as attitudes. RFT and stimulus equiva-
lence researchers were able to leverage derived 
relational responding processes to experimentally 
study attitudes and to use these processes as part 
of a theoretical account, but one challenge still 
remained- to develop a method which would 
allow a researcher to detect those histories. 
This breakthrough occurred when researchers 
(Watt, Keenan, Barnes, & Cairns, 1991) began 
to investigate how a particular history of verbal 
behavior might interfere with the formation of 
new relational responses – and as such, reveal 
itself to the experimenter.
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The Methodological Breakthrough: 
The Watt et al. Paradigm
In their seminal study, Watt et al. (1991) used a 
simple stimulus equivalence paradigm in which 
participants were trained to relate stimuli with 
strong socially established functions in ways that 
were inconsistent with their social history. Specifi-
cally, they took advantage of the fact that people 
in Northern Ireland often respond to names as 
indicative of religious background, and utilized 
stimuli representative of Catholic and Protestant 
names and symbols.
A three-phase experimental procedure was 
employed. Participants were first exposed to a 
matching to sample procedure comprising the 
presentation of either a nonsense syllable or a 
first and last name at the top of the screen (the 
“sample” stimulus). Three “comparison” stimuli 
were displayed separately below. Participants 
were instructed to select a comparison stimulus by 
pressing a corresponding key. Training comprised 
of one of three Catholic names being randomly 
chosen to serve as the sample stimulus. Beneath 
this, three nonsense syllables served as compari-
son stimuli and were arranged in a random order 
across the screen. Participants were required to 
select the correct comparison in the presence of the 
sample stimulus (A-B Relations). The second stage 
trained B-C relations. Here, the sample stimuli 
were selected from the list of nonsense syllables, 
and the comparison stimuli were selected from the 
list of Protestant symbols. Feedback was provided 
on all trials during Stage 1. During stage 2, cor-
rective feedback was presented following 50% of 
responses. The stimulus combinations described in 
Stage 1 were all presented in random order during 
this condition. Each stimulus combination was 
presented twice and participants were required 
to meet a 100% criterion.
Stage 3 of the Watt et al. procedure involved 
Equivalence Testing. For this stage, no corrective 
feedback was provided. Ten presentations of each 
of the stimulus combinations from Stage 1 were 
randomly presented. Interspersed with these were 
ten presentations each of six other stimulus com-
binations. Each of the three Protestant symbols 
served as sample stimuli and two of the Catholic 
names served as comparison stimuli. An additional 
Protestant name was included as a comparison 
stimulus for each of these three combinations of 
sample and comparison stimuli. The results of the 
Watt et al. study showed that during equivalence 
testing, all of the English participants correctly 
matched the Catholic names with the Protestant 
symbols, but 12 of the 19 Northern Irish partici-
pants chose a novel Protestant name in the pres-
ence of the Protestant symbols, thereby failing to 
derive the equivalence relations that the procedure 
usually occasions. These findings strongly sug-
gested that the social contingencies operating in 
Northern Ireland interfered with the establish-
ment of equivalence relations in the laboratory. 
The equivalence test required Northern Irish 
participants to juxtapose names and symbols in 
a manner that was counter-cultural for this group 
of participants. As such, the Watt et al. procedure 
had hit upon a basic methodology for inferring 
the social histories of participants, without using 
a direct questioning approach. It was, in effect, an 
early behavior-analytic implicit test.
Subsequent studies supported the suggestion 
made by Watt et al. that social history interferes 
with the formation of equivalence classes and 
that this phenomenon could be used to indirectly 
assess participants’ personal and social histories. 
For instance, in a study on gender identity, Moxon 
and Keenan (1993) found that participants had 
more difficulty forming equivalence classes when 
the classes included female names and stereotypic 
male occupations. Leslie, Tierney, Robinson, 
Keenan, Watt, and Barnes (1993) also employed 
the Watt et al. procedure in a study designed to 
differentiate between anxious and non-anxious 
participants. They found that anxious participants 
had more difficulty in matching pleasant-state 
adjectives to threatening situation descriptors 
than did control participants. In another study, 
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Merwin and Wilson (2005) required participants to 
form equivalence classes between self-referential 
terms and negative evaluations, and in a second 
procedure, between those terms and positive evalu-
ations. Participants who reported high distress and 
low esteem made significantly more errors when 
required to match “self” terms with positive items. 
Plaud (1995) showed that participants required 
significantly more training to derive equivalence 
classes made up of aversive stimuli (snake-related 
words) than classes made up of innocuous stimuli 
(flower related words). Importantly, the increase 
in the amount of training required to establish the 
equivalence classes correlated with self-reported 
fear of snakes.
These studies supported the assertion that pre-
experimental functions of stimuli could interfere 
with the formation of equivalence classes in the 
laboratory. However, in order to gain complete 
experimental control over this effect it was also 
necessary for researchers to create their own 
stimuli and to establish psychological functions 
for those stimuli using respondent and operant 
learning methods. Only in this way could the 
process by which individual words (i.e., stimuli 
with conditioned evaluative functions) interfere 
with class formation (derived or trained) be fully 
understood in functional, rather than theoretical, 
terms
The first study to address this issue was re-
ported by Roche, Barnes, and Smeets (1997). The 
experimenters trained participants on a matching to 
sample procedure that formed two three-member 
equivalence classes using nonsense syllables as 
stimuli (i.e. A1-B1-C1 and A2-B2-C2, where 
the A-C linkages are derived). The authors then 
paired two of the stimuli (A1 and C2) with sexu-
ally explicit film clips and two other stimuli (A2 
and C1) with nonsexual film clips, establishing 
conflicting sexual response functions for stimuli 
that had been trained in the laboratory as equiva-
lent. When re-exposed to the equivalence testing, 
participants reproduced the original equivalence 
relations (A1-C1 and A2-C2) and not the newly 
created and incongruous functional stimulus 
classes (A1-C2 and A2-C1). In a second experi-
ment, Roche et al. firstly established the sexual and 
nonsexual functions for the A1/C2 and A2 / C2 
pair respectively, and then presented participants 
with the matching-to-sample procedure. In this 
case, participants matched stimuli based on their 
conditioned sexual/non-sexual functions (i.e., A1 
with C2 and A2 with C1) rather than forming the 
equivalence classes required by the matching to 
sample procedure. This demonstrated that once 
an equivalence class is formed, it is difficult to 
disrupt with succeeding functional relations, and 
that the reverse is also true; it is difficult for par-
ticipants to form equivalence relations when they 
are incongruous with existing functional relations.
This issue was further examined by Tyndall, 
Roche and James (2004). They established two 
functional classes of stimuli; Six S+ stimuli 
(responding to the stimulus was reinforced) 
and Six S- stimuli (responding away from the 
stimuli was reinforced). In matching to sample 
training, participants were trained to form two 
three-member equivalence classes using four dif-
ferent combinations of S+/S- stimuli. Participants 
required more training to establish two distinct 
equivalence classes from amongst 6 S+ stimuli 
(i.e., stimuli sharing the same response function) 
than from amongst 6 S- stimuli (i.e., without a 
shared response function). Further, participants 
found it easier to form equivalence classes when 
they were required to separate S+ and S- stimuli 
than when they were required to form classes 
which mixed S+ and S- stimuli.
While in the 2004 paper, the stimulus func-
tions were emotionally neutral, Tyndall, Roche 
& James 2009 later studied the process using 
emotive stimuli. They created these stimuli by 
pairing six stimuli with aversive images and six 
further stimuli with neutral images, as an analog 
of everyday evaluative experiences often studied 
in attitude research. They then tested for the 
formation of those functional classes. In equiva-
lence training and testing, the authors found that 
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participants required significantly more training 
to establish two three-member equivalence classes 
from amongst the six aversive stimuli than from 
amongst the six neutral stimuli. In effect, Tyndall 
et al. (2004, 2009) more clearly demonstrated that 
learning tasks involving the formation of new 
stimulus relations can be used as indicators of 
the pre-existing relations between those stimuli.
The studies above were conducted at the same 
time that the IAT emerged as the preeminent 
Implicit Test. However, this research thread was 
developed independently from the social cognitive 
paradigm, with little or no contact between the 
two. In recent years, however, RFT researchers 
have begun to apply the lessons gleaned from this 
research to modeling performances on the IAT 
in terms of relational responding, and to develop 
testing methodologies that utilize insights from 
both threads of research. In the following section, 
the authors will outline a behavioral model of the 
IAT, before moving on to detail two new implicit 
testing methodologies which are built upon func-
tional foundations.
Connecting the Threads: A 
Functional Account of the 
Implicit Association Test
The Watt et al. procedure showed that a func-
tional process-based account of attitudes could 
be harnessed to create a subtle test for the verbal 
histories that underpin the attitude construct, at 
least from a behavioral perspective. However, the 
Watt et al. procedure was developed prior to the 
IAT and the widespread acceptance of the social 
cognitive / associationistic approach to attitudes. 
Their definition of attitudes did not make contact 
with the yet-to-emerge phenomenon of implicit 
attitudes. Indeed, from a behavioral perspective, 
the term “implicit” may not merit a unique ac-
count. It likely refers only to the relative speed of 
a response and therefore the relative probability 
that the response was mediated by further ver-
bal behavior, usually private. The processes of 
producing verbal responses that have been me-
diated by further private verbal responses (such 
as “I had better not say that” is) what behavior 
analysts refer to as thinking (or more technically 
behavior-behavior relations). It does not in itself 
constitute a special process different to other forms 
of relational responding or simple speaking. In 
effect, we take the word “implicit” to refer to the 
observation that the contingencies controlling 
the relevant responding are not discriminable by 
the participant to a sufficient degree to allow a 
conscious (i.e., verbally-mediated) alteration of 
the response so that it is relationally consistent 
with anything other than the stimulus presented 
during the implicit testing task. Put simply, the 
participant would require more time during im-
plicit test trials to observe the stimulus, respond 
to it privately, discriminate that response privately 
along with the controlling source as a specific prior 
history of trained or derived stimulus associations, 
discriminate that this history is socially undesir-
able, and then alter the response consciously in 
a manner referred to loosely as an example of 
social desirability. Rather, under time pressure the 
participant likely simply responds directly to the 
stimulus on screen, without additional mediating 
sequences of private verbal behavior.
From within a functional Relational Frame 
approach, the IAT is viewed as a measure of an 
individual’s verbal history vis-à-vis an assessment 
of their ability to form stimulus relations under 
time constraints. IAT effects are conceived in 
terms of participants’ fluency with the relevant 
verbal categories and their degree of experience at 
juxtaposing members of those verbal categories. 
For instance, an individual who has many dealings 
with people of a specific race, and has encountered 
both pleasant and unpleasant individuals from this 
racial group, will likely find it easy to juxtapose 
racial and evaluative terms in an IAT according 
to the test rules across the two test blocks. Such 
an individual will show no IAT effect (i.e., no 
response time or accuracy differential across the 
test blocks). On the other hand, if they have expe-
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rienced mostly unpleasant individuals from one 
racial group or other, the juxtaposition of response 
rules across the IAT blocks will likely expose a 
fluency differential across those two blocks (i.e., 
an IAT effect; see the behavioral account of Roche, 
Ruiz, O’Riordan & Hand, 2005).
The behavioral model of the IAT was tested 
empirically by Gavin et al. (2008) using nonsense 
syllables as stimuli and experimentally produced 
derived relations between them as laboratory 
analogs of verbal relations between words in 
the vernacular. Two equivalence relations were 
established in the usual manner, leading to the 
two classes of nonsense syllables, labeled here as 
A1-B1-C1 and A2-B2-C2, where the A-C relations 
were derived, not reinforced. An IAT-type test 
was then administered to measure participants’ 
ability to respond in the same way to common 
class member pairs (e.g., A1 and C1) compared 
to cross-class pairs (e.g., A1 and C2). Not surpris-
ingly, more errors were made in responding under 
rule conditions in which a common response was 
required for incompatible, compared to compat-
ible stimuli. In effect, typical IAT outcomes 
were generated using only directly manipulated 
variables and laboratory created stimuli, and in 
purely functional terms.
These entirely laboratory produced IAT effects 
were subsequently shown to be manipulable vis-
à-vis reversals of some of the baseline relations 
underlying the derived equivalence relations 
(Ridgeway et al., 2010). Such findings strengthen 
the behavior-analytic position that the IAT test for-
mat is sensitive to a participant’s history of relating 
the test stimuli, perhaps even including histories 
of stimulus relating that a participant would wish 
to conceal. However, they also shed new light 
on the fundamental processes that may entirely 
underpin the IAT effect and demonstrate that 
informative research can be done on implicit test 
processes from a functional perspective, without 
necessary recourse to associationistic explanatory 
mechanisms. For the cognitive researcher, these 
types of studies provide useful information that 
can inform the ongoing debate as to the form of 
the implicit attitude construct, opening up a wider 
array of explanations that go beyond the underlying 
associative narrative that informs most theorizing 
on the subject (Hughes et al., 2011). Further, this 
research thread has birthed two new functionally 
oriented implicit tests which are built on the in-
sights gained through functional research, meaning 
that their core processes are well articulated and 
supported by a wealth of basic research.
Functional Implicit Tests
The Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure
The behavioral methodologies described thus far 
were focused largely on identifying behavioral pro-
cesses and were prototypical in nature rather than 
designed for use in real world studies of attitudes. 
In recent years, two distinct behavioral implicit 
tests have been developed for real world applica-
tion. The first of these is the Implicit Relational 
Assessment Procedure (IRAP; Barnes-Holmes, 
Hayden, Barnes-Holmes, & Stewart, 2006). This 
test is in many ways procedurally similar to the 
IAT. However, each trial of the IRAP displays 
two stimuli (rather than just one) on screen (e.g., 
“Child” and “Sexual”) along with a contextual cue 
that specifies the relation between the two stimuli 
(e.g., “Same” or “Opposite.”). The participant is 
required to respond quickly to this resulting rela-
tional statement (“Child SAME Sexual” or “Child 
OPPOSITE Sexual”) with a key press that cor-
responds to one of two response options (e.g., for 
“TRUE” press z, for “FALSE” press m). Feedback 
is only presented if the response in incorrect as 
defined by the block rules (a red X is displayed) 
or if the response latency is lower than the stated 
criterion (the words “too slow” are displayed). 
Like the IAT, trials in the IRAP are organized into 
blocks. In one type of block, the responses defined 
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as correct are those that are consistent with social 
norms (e.g. Child OPPOSITE Sexual – TRUE = 
Correct) while the other block requires responses 
that are inconsistent with social norms.
A recent IRAP study by Dawson and Barnes-
Holmes (2009) tested for pre-existing child-sex 
stimulus relations in a child sex offender popula-
tion. Sixteen participants who had been convicted 
of a contact sexual offence against a child (the 
offender group) and sixteen male non-offenders 
recruited from a college population (the control 
group) completed an IRAP procedure and a Cogni-
tive Distortion Scale (CDS; Gannon, 2009). The 
IRAP stimuli consisted of two category labels 
(“Child” and “Adult”) and two sets of target stimuli 
(“sexual” words and “non-sexual” words). During 
the consistent blocks, participants were required 
to respond with “true” to the relations “Adult – 
Sexual” and “Child – Nonsexual” while in the 
inconsistent blocks participants were required 
to respond in the opposite way. The IRAP suc-
cessfully detected a difference in response time 
differentials across the control group and the 
offender group. Furthermore, the IRAP was able 
to identify the specific relation on which the two 
groups differed. Specifically, on Child-Sexual tri-
als, the offender group did not show a significant 
IRAP effect, responding equally quickly to Child-
Sexual-False and Child-Sexual-True, whereas 
non-offenders tended to show a reaction time 
differential across these blocks.
Dermot Barnes-Holmes and colleagues have 
devised a behavior-analytic and functional ac-
count of the IRAP and related implicit test effects 
based on Relational Frame Theory, which they 
call the Relational Elaboration Coherence Model 
(REC; Barnes-Holmes, Barnes-Holmes, Stewart, 
& Boles, 2010). It is a more formally elaborated 
account than the loose working definition of im-
plicitness provided above and first proposed by 
Roche et al. (2005). According to the REC model, 
each individual trial on the IRAP produces an im-
mediate and brief response to the relation presented 
before the participant presses a response key. The 
probability of this initial response is a function of 
participants’ verbal and non-verbal history with 
the stimuli and the current contextual cues (i.e., 
the relational stimulus, such as the word opposite 
on screen). The most probable response will likely 
be emitted first. If this immediate response coheres 
with the response required by the current IRAP 
trial rule, then the response latency will be lower. 
If the required response is in opposition with the 
participants’ immediate relational response, then 
the correct (as defined by the contingencies of 
the specific trial) response will be emitted more 
slowly. Across multiple trials, the average latency 
on inconsistent trials will be higher than the aver-
age latency for consistent trials.
The foregoing provides a basic explanation 
for the IRAP effect, but the REC model extends 
the explanation to account for why implicit 
measures and explicit questionnaire methods so 
often diverge in their results. More specifically, 
when completing questionnaires or other so called 
“explicit” measures of attitudes, the participant is 
under little time pressure and can therefore engage 
in complex and extended relational responding 
(i.e., thinking) which allows them to produce a 
response which is coherent with other responses 
in their behavioral repertoire (see Barnes-Holmes, 
Hayes & Dymond, 2001) such as; “it is wrong to 
categorize children as sexual.” It is also possible 
under these circumstances to produce a response 
that coheres with the social expectations of others. 
However, when exposed to the IRAP (or other 
implicit test) procedure, participants are under 
significant pressure to respond quickly (com-
monly within 2000 ms) and, therefore have little 
time to engage in the elaborate private relational 
responding necessary to produce alternative so-
cially desirable responses. In effect, the most likely 
responses under time constraint conditions are 
those that are immediate and brief and therefore 
direct measures of history, unmediated by local 
relational activity.
The IRAP has a well worked out functional 
explanatory account accompanying its procedure, 
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and addresses the concerns of the experimental 
analyst of behavior in how it approaches the matter 
of implicit testing. Nevertheless, the test procedure 
is sufficiently intensive for the participant that 
rapid administrations of the test are not possible. 
This is because the test consists of a practice 
block, several re-administrations of test blocks, 
and a relatively high rate of subject attrition due 
to a failure to reach fluency criteria within the 
test itself. However, a further behavior-analytic 
test has been developed to address this and other 
concerns. Specifically the Function Acquisition 
Speed Test (FAST; O’Reilly, Roche, Ruiz, Tyndall 
& Gavin, 2012; O’Reilly, Roche, Ryan & Campion, 
2013) was developed within a functional research 
paradigm but with the express purpose of being 
easy and fast to administer. The test also addresses 
the problem of the relative nature of biases and 
preferences as indexed by the IAT and the IRAP. 
Before this issue is addressed, however, a brief 
outline of the FAST methodology is merited.
The Function Acquisition 
Speed Test (FAST)
The FAST requires participants to complete a 
number of simple discrimination blocks with 
minimal instructions, and no instructions at all 
relating to appropriate responses. Each trial 
presents a single stimulus, and participants are 
required to learn, via trial and error and correc-
tive feedback, whether to respond with a “left” 
key press (e.g., press “a” or press “z”) or a “right” 
key press (e.g. press “j” or press “m”). For two of 
the stimuli, a “left” key press is reinforced, while 
for the other two, a “right” key press is reinforced. 
Participants are required to continue the block until 
their responses are fluent; that is both rapid and 
accurate as defined by the production of a specific 
succession of correct responses (usually 10). As 
a result there is no predetermined block length. 
Blocks are completed when response fluency has 
been achieved. Feedback is presented following all 
trials and there is no error correction procedure. 
Response speed is constrained not by instruction 
but by a finite response window (usually 3s). There 
are no instructions or response rules, other than to 
produce as many correct responses as possible. The 
metric of interest is the differential in the number 
of trials required to reach response fluency across 
two critical test blocks.
A FAST contains two “test blocks”, each of 
which uses the same four stimuli. Two stimuli are 
the stimuli of interest, suspected to be related in 
the participant’s history. The other two are novel, 
unrelated stimuli. In this regard the FAST is not 
unlike a single target IAT. In the “consistent” 
block, the same response is reinforced (e.g., press 
z) for both of the target stimuli of interest, while 
another response (e.g., press m) is reinforced for 
the novel innocuous stimuli. These responses are 
consistent with the participant’s learning history, 
and so should quickly result in stable, high rate 
responding by the participant. In the “inconsistent 
block”, the reinforced responses are inconsistent 
with the participant’s learning history insofar as 
different responses (“press z” and “press m”) are 
required for each of two (thought-to-be-related) 
target stimuli. In effect, the juxtaposition of current 
and past reinforcement contingencies during the 
inconsistent block functions as a type of learning 
disrupter. The current learning contingencies need 
to overcome the “behavioral inertia” of the pre-ex-
perimental contingencies that maintain a specific 
stimulus relation in order for fluent responding to 
be produced (i.e., learning). In simple terms, the 
“inconsistent” response classes are more difficult 
for participants to acquire. The differences in rates 
of response class acquisition across the two test 
blocks is used to index the pre-existing “strength” 
of the relation under investigation.
Critically, the FAST also contains a “base-
line” block, in which all four stimuli are novel 
and unrelated (e.g., nonsense syllables). The 
purpose of this block is to measure the rate of 
acquisition of an arbitrary response class under 
test conditions but without any interfering effect 
from pre-experimental contingencies. The number 
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of trials to criterion on the baseline block places 
differences in acquisition speed across the main 
FAST blocks in context. For example, for a par-
ticipant who completes such tasks very quickly, a 
small difference in acquisition rates between the 
inconsistent and consistent test blocks is more 
meaningful that the same raw fluency difference 
is for a participant with large baseline trial re-
quirements. This relationship between differences 
in learning speed across critical FAST blocks, 
and baseline acquisition speed is the basis of a 
Strength of Relation index used to quantify the 
“strength” of a pre-existing relation between the 
stimuli of interest.
The FAST has been shown to be capable of 
detecting relations between laboratory created 
stimuli and relations (O’Reilly et al., 2012) as 
well as derived relations (O’Reilly et al, 2013). 
It has also been used with real world stimuli to 
measure categorization of teenaged females as 
sexual (see Roche et al., 2012), but is still in early 
stages of development.
One exciting feature of the FAST worth outlin-
ing at this stage relates to its circumnavigation of 
the problem of relativism in inferences regarding 
attitudinal biases. Specifically, the IAT provides 
only a relative measure of association strength 
(De Houwer, 2002, Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 
2004). That is, an IAT trial involves both respond-
ing towards one category while responding away 
from the other, and thus it is impossible to deter-
mine which of these response forms is at work 
in controlling the participant’s correct response 
rate differentials across test blocks, or the extent 
to which one or the other contributes to the total 
effect. More specifically, given the result of a 
race IAT, only the question; “Is White preferred 
to Black” is answered. Even though the bias may 
be reliably recorded it remains unclear whether or 
not the bias is characterized by a participant having 
a history of pro-white responding or a history of 
anti-black responding. In effect, the structure of 
the IAT (and the IRAP) requires that the attitude 
being studied be stated in symmetrical terms. 
While this provides a useful index of whether an 
attitude is present for a participant, the specific 
pattern of relational responding that characterizes 
the attitude may be crucial to the development of 
interventions to change those attitudes.
CONCLUSION
While there remains much to be done in the de-
velopment of the FAST, its development and that 
of the IRAP illustrate that behavior analysis has 
much to offer the field of implicit testing by way 
of ground-up functional accounts of the behavioral 
processes relevant to attitude measurement and in 
the development of appropriate methodologies 
to this end. The functional account of attitudes 
detailed in this chapter led directly to these new 
methodologies, and the understanding of the pro-
cesses leveraged by these tests means that strong 
predictions can be made and empirically tested, 
thus rapidly advancing knowledge with regard to 
the conditions under which attitudes, implicit and 
otherwise, are formed and maintained, and how 
they can be changed. The functional approach of-
fers the hope of providing an account that renders 
explicit those very processes social cognitivists 
refer to as implicit.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Attitude: An attitude is usually defined as 
being a combination of cognitive (i.e. proposi-
tional) and affective evaluations of an object with 
a variable strength.
Conditional Discrimination: A discrimina-
tion between stimuli, in which the reinforcement 
of responding to one stimulus (e.g., a choice from 
an array) is conditional upon the presence of a 
further stimulus (i.e., the conditional stimulus).
Construct: A hypothetical construct is an 
explanatory variable that is not directly observ-
able, but which nevertheless has heuristic value. 
For example, the concepts of intelligence and 
motivation are used to explain phenomena in 
psychology, but neither is directly observable or 
deemed to be extant entities.
Functional Analysis: An analysis of behavior 
in terms of its antecedents, consequences and 
over-arching context.
Operant Conditioning: A process by which 
behavior rate is altered as a function of delivered 
consequences (appetitive or aversive) that im-
mediately follow responses according to a known 
schedule.
Relational Responding: Responding to rela-
tions between stimuli rather than to the stimuli in 
isolation. Example of relations include; similarity, 
difference, and temporal sequence.
Stimulus Equivalence: A phenomenon 
whereby untrained relations between at least three 
stimuli emerge spontaneously and bear the defin-
ing characteristics of reflexivity, symmetry, and 
transitivity. Reflexivity refers to identity match-
ing (e.g., A is A); symmetry refers to functional 
reversibility (e.g., given A is B, B is A is derived 
spontaneously); and, transitivity refers to the 
functional equivalence of stimuli related to each 
other only via a third stimulus (e.g., given A is 
B and B is C, A is C is derived spontaneously).
View publication stats
